CASE: R. v. Hibbert, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973

LOCATION:

R. v. Hibbert, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973

CASE RELATES TO:

Criminal Code s.21 Aiding and Party to Common Intention

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The meaning of "purpose" in s. 21(1)(b) and of "intention in common" in s. 21(2) were questioned in this case. At trial, the accused testified that on the night of the shooting he had accidentally run into B, who indicated to him that he was armed with a handgun and ordered the accused to take him to C's apartment and shoot him. When the accused refused, B punched him in the face several times. The accused stated that he feared for his life and believed that B would shoot him if he did not cooperate with him. So he did as orded.

HELD:

The court ordered a new trial, but because of duress (the threats) not because of the meaning of section 21. The Supreme Court clarified what satisfies section 21 in this case.

REASONING AND LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE:

Section 21(1)(b), which imposes criminal liability as a party on anyone who "does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit" an offence, does not require that the accused actively view the commission of the offence he is aiding as desirable. Parliament's use of the term "purpose" in s. 21(1)(b) is essentially [the same as] "intention" and does not incorporate the notion of "desire" [at all]. This interpretation, …is in accord with the common law… and avoids the absurdity that would flow from the equation of "purpose" with "desire".

As well, under s. 21(2), which provides that "persons [who] form an intention in common to carry out an unlawful purpose and to assist each other therein" are liable for criminal offences committed by the principal that are foreseeable and probable consequences of "carrying out the common purpose", the accused's subjective view as to the desirability of the commission of the offence is not relevant.